Law enforcement is in unanimous agreement that the widespread use of robust non- key recovery encryption ultimately will devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. Clearly, in today's world and more so in the future, the ability to encrypt both contemporaneous communications and stored data is a vital component of information security.Īs is so often the case, however, there is another aspect to the encryption issue that if left unaddressed will have severe public safety and national security ramifications. In this time of dazzling telecommunications and computer technology where information can have extraordinary value, the ready availability of robust encryption is essential. In 1997, Louis Freeh, then the Director of the FBI, saidįor law enforcement, framing the issue is simple.
#FREEDOME MUNITIONS SOFTWARE#
NSA officials anticipated that the American encryption software backed by an extensive infrastructure, when marketed, was likely to become a standard for international communications. As late as 1997, NSA officials in the US were concerned that the widespread use of strong encryption will frustrate their ability to provide SIGINT regarding foreign entities, including terrorist groups operating internationally.
The development and public release of Data Encryption Standard (DES) and asymmetric key techniques in the 1970s, along with the rise of the Internet, and the willingness of some to risk and resist prosecution, eventually made this policy impossible to enforce, and by the late 1990s it was being relaxed in the U.S., and to some extent elsewhere (e.g., France). developments by others was more practical - there were no constitutional impediments.Īccordingly, regulations were introduced as part of munitions controls which required licenses to export cryptographic methods (and even their description) the regulations established that cryptography beyond a certain strength (defined by algorithm and length of key) would not be licensed for export except on a case-by-case basis. The First Amendment made controlling all use of cryptography inside the U.S. They also wished to monitor the diplomatic communications of other nations, including those emerging in the post-colonial period and whose position on Cold War issues was vital. believed they had better cryptographic capabilities than other nations, their intelligence agencies tried to regulate the dissemination of effective cryptographic techniques. ĭue to the enormous impact of cryptanalysis in World War II, these governments saw the military value in denying current and potential enemies access to cryptographic systems. Munitions List as an Auxiliary Military Equipment. and its NATO allies, have regulated the export of cryptography for national security reasons, and, as late as 1992, cryptography was on the U.S. Since World War II, many governments, including the U.S. The law gradually became eased until around 2000, but some restrictions still remain today. citizens to show it to foreigners.Įxport of cryptographic technology and devices from the United States was severely restricted by U.S. Changes in the export law means that it is no longer illegal to export this T-shirt from the U.S., or for U.S. encryption export restrictions ( Back side).
#FREEDOME MUNITIONS CODE#
Export-restricted RSA encryption source code printed on a T-shirt made the T-shirt an export-restricted munition, as a freedom of speech protest against U.S.
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